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Abstract 
 
Purpose – This research aims to provide a global overview of the adoption status of IPSASs in the 
different contexts of developed and developing countries on central government level, particularly 
delineating key reform issues and attempts to overcome these. 
Design/methodology/approach – The material for this paper was derived through document analysis 
and a synthesis of prior research. Applying an analytical framework that combines neo-institutional 
theory with diffusion theory, this material is re-analysed. 
Findings – There are substantial differences regarding whether countries acknowledge having 
experienced large implementation challenges and the extent to which the reform benefits have been 
achieved. The study sheds light on the (institutional) underpinnings of these differences. 
Research limitations/implications – First, the analysis could be extended to regional and local 
governments, as well as social funds. Both qualitative and quantitative strategies are suggested. 
Second, the implementation of the conceptual framework deserves further attention. Third, further 
research should more thoroughly scrutinise cost-benefit analyses used for justifying the 
(non)implementation of IPSASs, and in particular the assumptions that are being made in such 
analyses. 
Practical implications – The paper informs policymakers and standard setters by delineating the 
areas and issues complicating the widespread adoption of IPSASs across countries, including pointing 
out directions to overcome these. 
Social implications – Substantial amounts of public money are invested internationally to converge 
accounting standards and translate them into native languages. A close(r) monitoring is needed to 
ensure that these efforts obtain sufficient value for money. 
Originality/value – This study is original as it applies an analytical framework that combines neo-
institutional theory and diffusion theory to examine public sector accounting convergence issues 
internationally. Such an approach explicitly puts a focus on decoupling between reform ‘walk’ 
(decision) and ‘talk’ (implementation) and helps to analyse the reasons for this decoupling. 
 
Introduction 
 
Steps taken by Western developed countries to adopt public sector accounting reforms – mainly 
accrual accounting (henceforth ACC.A) – have resulted in an intense academic debate (see, for 
example, Manes Rossi et al., 2016, amongst many others). Whilst some academics are convinced of 
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the benefits of ACC.A (Brusca and Martinez, 2016; Bergmann, 2012), others believe these are largely 
overstated (Guthrie, 1998; Bromwich and Lapsley, 1997). Cases where politicians and other users 
have actually utilised accrual information in decision-making are scarce (Ezzamel et al., 2014; 
Hepworth, 2015; Liguori and Steccolini, 2018). Developed countries are becoming increasingly 
convinced of the need for ACC.A, either as a means for demonstrating governments’ long-term 
sustainability or for managing the consequences of fiscal and sovereign debt crises (Adhikari and 
Gårseth-Nesbakk, 2016). It has been argued that the recent financial crisis has made the adoption of 
ACC.A inevitable for public sector entities in Western countries (Ball and Pflugrath, 2012). However, 
the debate has now shifted towards the significance of the adoption of International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards (IPSASs) for achieving the above-mentioned aims (Christiaens et al., 2015; 
Manes Rossi et al., 2015). The IPSASs supposedly supplement the effective use of ACC.A and 
reinforce intended benefits for improved public sector governance and accountability (Ball and 
Pflugrath, 2012; Manes Rossi et al., 2016). Mirroring the scope of this special issue, this study centres 
on the diffusion of IPSASs in developed and developing countries. 
Although not to the same extent as studies of Western countries, research covering the efforts 
of developing countries to streamline their public sector accounting systems has increased in recent 
years (Adhikari and Mellemvik, 2010; Hopper et al., 2017). Particularly, international organisations – 
the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – push ACC.A and IPSASs as 
being allegedly important to improve day-to-day accounting (Goddard et al., 2016; Harun et al., 
2012). These reforms are promoted as being learnt from the ‘best (accounting) practices’ of Western 
countries. Their adoption in developing countries is reckoned to be paramount to ensure sound 
governance, accountability and sustained economic growth (ACCA, 2017). More recently, however, 
challenges associated with adopting ACC.A and IPSASs in developing countries have been 
acknowledged (Bakre et al., 2017; Goddard et al., 2016; Hopper et al., 2017; Lassou, 2017), and their 
suitability has been questioned (Hepworth, 2017). This has led international organisations and donors 
to promote the Cash Basis IPSAS as an intermediate step to improve the quality of accounting 
information and financial reporting in these countries (Adhikari et al., 2015). The Cash Basis IPSAS 
is predicated on the assumption that it would help developing countries obtain the required capacity 
and competence to undertake a transition towards ACC.A in the longer term. 
Extant work demonstrates that while IPSASs adoption (we refer to this in this paper as the 
‘talk’) has become largely an externally driven exercise in a range of countries, the (actual) 
implementation and outcomes (i.e. the ‘walk’) have been often disappointing (Anglo-Saxon countries 
being an exception). Critics state that IPSASs privilege the interests of international financial 
organisations (e.g. the WB and the IMF), policymakers and standard setters (e.g. the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], the International Federation of Accountants 
[IFAC] and the European Commission), and professional accounting firms and associations (e.g. the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants [ACCA] or PricewaterhouseCoopers), marginalising 
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the context-specific elements, as well as the actual accounting needs of countries (Adhikari and 
Gårseth-Nesbakk, 2016).  
This research aims to provide an overview of the adoption status of IPSASs in the different 
contexts of developed and developing countries on central government level, particularly delineating 
key reform issues and attempts to overcome these. Mirroring these aims, the research question is as 
follows: What is the current status of the adoption and implementation of the IPSASs at central 
government level in developing and developed countries? 
The material for this paper was derived through document analysis and a synthesis of prior 
research. Drawing on an analytical framework that combines neo-institutional theory (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and diffusion theory (Rogers, 2003; Abrahamson, 1991), 
this material is re-analysed. The research is relevant, as substantial amounts of public money are 
invested internationally to streamline public sector accounting systems. A close(r) monitoring is 
needed to ensure that these efforts obtain sufficient value for money. In a nutshell, it is found that 
there are considerable differences regarding whether countries acknowledge having experienced large 
implementation challenges, and the extent to which the reform benefits have been achieved and shed 
light on the (institutional) underpinnings of these. With this, the paper also informs policymakers and 
standard setters by delineating the areas and issues complicating the widespread adoption and 
implementation of IPSASs across countries. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section two highlights the key ideas of neo-
institutional and diffusion theory and discusses their significance in the current work. The method is 
presented in section three, followed by two parts addressing IPSASs in developing and developed 
countries, respectively. These two sections comment on major tendencies in the countries dealing 
with IPSASs, including implementation strategies and drivers, as well as associated challenges and 
unintended consequences. The last section combines the associated discussion and provides a number 
of concluding remarks. 
 
Combining Neo-Institutionalism and Diffusion Theory in the Study of Public Sector Accounting 
Reforms 
 
Neo-institutional theory has become a dominant lens through which to generate insights into public 
sector accounting reforms, focusing on the role of external institutional factors. Accounting 
researchers have analysed the types of pressures that dominate the adoption of IPSASs (Modell, 2009; 
Jacobs, 2012). However, the implementation of IPSASs across countries has not been straightforward, 
which has resulted in the modification of and resistance to standards in different contexts (Oulasvirta, 
2014).  
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Diffusion theory explores challenges that externally propagated ideas (IPSASs) have 
encountered in the process of implementation. While neo-institutional theory facilitates understanding 
of IPSASs dissemination across countries, diffusion theory enables an analysis of the varied context-
specific elements that have provided obstacles in their implementation. This attempt at applying 
multiple theories based on similar ontological and epistemological assumptions is considered a 
promising way to offer deeper reflections on public sector accounting practices and reforms (Modell, 
2013; Modell et al., 2017; Jacobs, 2012 and 2013). 
Neo-institutional theory holds the view that an organisation’s success and survival largely 
depend on how it engages with its external environment in day-to-day operations (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Based on an organisation’s position and influence, available knowledge and availability of 
resources, external influences and pressures can take different forms, ranging from coercive to 
mimetic to normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). While coercive pressure is linked to state 
intervention and excess dependency on external resources, mimetic pressure concerns with imitating 
other successful organisations, especially when environmental, regulatory and technical uncertainties 
are abounding. Normative pressures are, however, more subtle as they tend to originate from the 
profession and scholars (ibid.). While the dissemination of IPSASs in developing countries is often 
related to coercive pressure (Adhikari et al., 2013), their adoption by some developed countries is in 
some cases claimed to be an imitation fuelled by anxiety-driven pressures to conform to stresses 
brought about by modernity (Hyndman and Connolly, 2011; Adhikari and Gårseth-Nesbakk, 2016). 
Professional accounting firms have become important boundary spanners in disseminating IPSASs in 
developed and developing countries (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003). In the presence of multiple 
institutional pressures, countries might embrace IPSASs without being convinced of the expected 
benefits and without ascertaining whether they really fit into their operating context (Hepworth, 
2017). Prior studies show that compliance with external requirements enhances legitimacy, but the 
externally inflicted ideas tend to remain dysfunctional or decoupled in practice (Adhikari et al., 2013).  
Diffusion theory has been appreciated for the emphasis it has placed on elaborating on the 
notion of decoupling (Adhikari et al., 2015; Ezzamel et al., 2014). This theory traces six different 
stages in the reform process: ‘prior conditions’, ‘knowledge on reform innovations’, ‘persuasion’, 
‘decision’, ‘implementation’ and ‘confirmation’ (Rogers, 2003). The first four phases largely overlap 
with neo-institutional theory, as they are connected to organisations’ interactions with their external 
environments (Malmi, 1991).  
Decisions on adopting reforms rather than their actual implementation are usually sufficient 
to ensure legitimacy and survival. This is exemplified by a range of failed accounting reforms in 
developing countries (Hopper et al., 2017). However, central to diffusion theory is the fact that the 
decisions on reforms do not automatically lead to their implementation in practice and their 
confirmation. Implementation is considered to be the most complex and problematic stage of the 
diffusion trajectory (Rogers, 2003). Prior work based on diffusion theory states that the 
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implementation of reforms is determined by at least three different contextual factors: the complexity 
of reforms; the engagement of adopters, including communication flows, informal networking and 
boundary spanning; and the consistency of reforms with the adopters’ values (Adhikari et al., 2015; 
Ezzamel et al., 2014; Jackson and Lapsley, 2003). At the implementation phase, reforms tend to be 
altered, modified and reinvented so as to comply with the requirements of the specific settings. 
Studies have delineated cases where reforms have failed to replace the prevailing practices, thereby 
just layering up and becoming rather ceremonial. For example, Adhikari et al. (2015) argue that 
ceremonial adoption is more striking when reforms are supplier-led (i.e. by international donors in the 
case of developing countries) and when local requirements and needs are marginalised. The supplier-
led reforms are often influenced by ‘pro-innovation biases’, which implies that externally prescribed 
best practices are likely to bring benefits to the adopting organisations (Abrahamson, 1991; Jackson 
and Lapsley, 2003; Malmi, 1991). What is more, Baskerville and Grossi (2019) observe a 
‘glocalisation’ of accounting standards, i.e. local adaptation of global standards. All such tactics, 
including alternation, modification and reinvention, enable organisations and countries to claim 
conformity, without abandoning the reforms or having to put them into practice.  
Combining central ideas of neo-institutional theory and diffusion theory, the paper analyses 
the diffusion of IPSASs in both developed and developing countries – differentiating between 
formally decided and actually implemented reforms. Also, light will be shed on the (possible) reasons 
for if a decoupling between reform ‘walk’ (decision) and ‘talk’ (implementation) has been identified. 
 
Method 
 
In order to obtain an overview of IPSAS adoption in developing and developed countries, a literature 
search was conducted, using the ‘ABI/INFORM’, ‘EBSCO’, ‘Google Scholar’ and ‘Web of Science’ 
databases as points of departure. Key words for the search included ‘IPSAS AND developed countr*’, 
as well as ‘IPSAS AND developing countr*’ and ‘IPSAS AND emerging econom*’. As the topic is 
still relatively under-researched (at least for developing countries – Lassou, 2017), studies issued by 
professional accounting bodies were also considered, such as the IFAC and the ACCA, alongside 
publications by international organisations (the latter included the Asian Development Bank [ADB], 
the IMF, the OECD and the WB). In particular, a survey conducted and published jointly by the IFAC 
and the OECD was an important source for mapping the IPSASs adoption in developed countries 
(IFAC and OECD, 2017). This search strategy was complemented with a snowballing approach, i.e. 
going through the references of a source to identify additional sources. The findings were structured 
by grouping the extracted information into geographic regions and administrative cultures according 
to certain categories. The first interest was the implementation strategy pursued, as several principles 
for sequencing public financial reforms have been previously discussed (Bietenhader and Bergmann, 
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2010). Next, in order to trace the institutional factors propelling adoption, there was a concentration 
on the drivers of implementation. Last, in order to look deeply into decoupling between reform ‘walk’ 
and ‘talk’ (in cases identified), a focus was placed on two further aspects: implementation challenges 
and unintended consequences of implementation. An overview of the results of the analysis of the 
identified studies is presented in three tables in the Appendix (Table 1: IPSASs in Developing 
Countries; Table 2: IPSASs in Developed Countries; Table 3: ACC.A Reforms in OECD Countries). 
 
IPSASs in Developing Countries 
 
IPSASs in South Asia 
 
The diffusion of IPSASs, particularly the Cash Basis, was triggered in the region after the WB issued 
a report in 2007 (Adhikari and Mellemvik, 2010; Wang and Miraj, 2018). The report, for each 
individual country, compared existing public sector accounting and auditing standards with 
international standards.  
In Bangladesh, institutional pressures for the Cash Basis IPSAS have increased in recent years 
due to the involvement of professional accountants. However, technical ambiguities and a lack of 
training and education for public administrators manifest that its implementation has remained more a 
rhetoric than a reality (Rajib et al., 2017; Sellami and Gafsi, 2019). 
A similar situation is evident in Nepal, in which the progress of implementing the Cash Basis 
IPSAS adopted in 2009 has been confined to the experimentation of the standard in a few central level 
ministries (Adhikari and Jayasinghe, 2017). In addition, stakeholder engagement is regarded as low 
(Adhikari et al., 2015). 
In India, although the Government Accounting Standards Advisory Board has issued several 
accrual-based standards using IPSASs as a reference, these are yet be approved by central government 
(Wang and Miraj, 2018). In its report, the ACCA (2017) states that IPSASs adoption in India is likely 
to be delayed for ten to 12 years due to the requirements of the valuation of assets and liabilities when 
preparing the opening balance sheet (OBS). 
Pakistan is still in the process of achieving compliance between IPSASs and the ‘New 
Accounting Mode’ that has been developed in collaboration with the WB and other donors (ACCA, 
2017). The Pakistani financial statements have been found to be compliant with the requirements 
prescribed by the Cash Basis IPSAS (Miraj and Wang, 2018). 
Sri Lanka was an exception in that the Cash Basis IPSAS had already been in force since 2002 
(Yapa and Ukwatte, 2015; Wang and Miraj, 2018). However, the implementation of accrual basis 
IPSASs has remained uncertain here, due to a lack of political support, as well as internal conflicts 
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between the Treasury and the Institute of Chartered Accountants with regard to the authority over the 
standards. Although the accrual basis IPSASs (SLPSASs) are available for voluntary compliance, 
there is no evidence suggesting that any public entities comply with these standards while preparing 
their financial statements (Adhikari et al., 2013; Wang and Miraj, 2018). Other countries, including 
Afghanistan, Bhutan and the Maldives, have expressed their desire to maintain compliance with the 
Cash Basis IPSAS since almost a decade ago (Adhikari and Mellemvik, 2010). However, this desire is 
yet to have been materialised in practice. 
Summing up, in the case of South Asia, almost all countries, except India and Sri Lanka, have 
declared the adoption of Cash Basis, as part of satisfying the lending conditionality of the WB and 
donors (Adhikari and Mellemvik, 2010). With India as an exception, both the institutional pressures 
and the existence of pro-innovation biases towards the Cash Basis IPSAS are clearly evident in the 
region. However, technical ambiguities inherited into these standards, the intervention of professional 
accountants and a lack of education and training of public administrators have hampered the 
implementation process, making it merely a legitimacy seeking activity. 
 
IPSASs in Africa 
 
Institutional pressures for the adoption of IPSASs and their implementation have drawn more 
critics in Africa as compared with other developing contexts (Hopper et al., 2017). Wynne (2013) 
states that more than 30 governments in Africa have attempted to adopt the Cash Basis of IPSAS in 
the last decade to cope with external pressures, but the standard’s requirements have proved to be 
impractical in their specific contexts. In particular, the two key requirements of the Cash Basis IPSAS 
– developing consolidated statements and disclosing support received in kind from donors – have led 
to a large number of African countries abandoning the adoption. 
A few other countries have attempted to comply with the requirements of preparing the 
consolidated statements, but not in a way as prescribed by the standard. For instance, South Africa 
produces separate consolidated statements for its public entities and these are not reconciled with 
those developed by national ministries (Wynne, 2013). Van Wyk (2007) has demonstrated that 
IPSASs implementation in the provincial governments of South Africa has become dysfunctional due 
to a shortage of skilled staff. Similarly, Uganda produces consolidated statements incorporating 
central level ministries, but excluding its government business entities (ACCA, 2017). 
Other countries, including Zimbabwe and Ghana, have declared the adoption of IPSASs with a 
transition period spanning over several years. This has led to suspicions as to whether their intentions 
are genuine or driven by a desire of representing facades (ACCA, 2017; Lassou, 2017). Goddard et al. 
(2016, p. 19) demonstrate the case of Tanzania in which all financial statements were stamped as 
‘fully IPSASs compliant’, although this was far from the reality. This manipulation was meant to 
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convince donors and international organisations that they could cope with their institutional pressures 
and to ensure the release of committed resources. 
More recent studies demonstrate that the forceful adoption of IPSASs in many African 
countries, as part of complying with the WB’s lending conditionality, has resulted in disastrous 
results, promoting the rise of corruption, patronage politics and neo-patrimonialism (Hopper et al., 
2017). For instance, in their study of IPSASs in Nigeria, Bakre et al. (2017) have demonstrated how 
the adoption of these IPSASs enabled the politicians to conceal widespread patronage and corruption 
in the sale of government properties. A similar situation has been experienced in Benin where IPSASs 
and other public sector accounting reforms have provided a space for clientelism, corruption and 
patronage to flourish rather than leading to any improvements in governance and accountability 
(Lassou, 2017). It is concluded that ‘decoupling appeared to be facilitated or prompted by the 
prevailing neo-patrimonial governance system wherein implementation decisions are taken in 
informal settings underpinned by a culture of secrecy’ (ibid., p. 502). 
In conclusion, the African cases manifest that the adoption of IPSASs in the continent has 
become more a symbolic means of seeking external legitimacy, and these reforms are loosely, if not 
completely, decoupled from day-to-day practices, not least due to their technical complexities 
(Andrews, 2010). A lack of engagement of the professional accounting institutions and an absence of 
boundary spanners have added further difficulties in implementing reforms in many African 
countries. 
 
IPSASs in the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
In the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesian public sector accounting reforms have apparently drawn much 
attention of accounting researchers (Harun et al., 2012, 2013 and 2019; McLeod and Harun, 2014). 
ACC.A has been widely disseminated in Indonesia both at central and local levels. This development 
follows regulatory changes and the formulation of a new set of standards for public sector accounting 
based on double-entry and the accrual principle at the beginning of the new century. The 
implementation of ACC.A has been underpinned by the Indonesian Government Accounting 
Standards, which comply with the accrual basis IPSAS (APEC, 2013). However, politicians and other 
stakeholders are neither convinced of the benefits of ACC.A nor capable of applying accrual 
information in decision-making. As a result, cash accounting and ACC.A run in parallel (McLeod and 
Harun, 2014). In a recent study, it was found that ‘reforms have produced serious unintended 
outcomes: local élites (i.e. elected officials) are not acting in the public interests, the internal audit of 
local governments has been weakened and corruption continues’ (Harun et al., 2019, p. 93). 
ACC.A and Thai public sector accrual accounting standards (TPSASs), which are based on 
IPSASs, have encountered challenges in the implementation stage (Nakmahachalasint and Narktabtee, 
2019). It is argued that the ‘walk’ has not been as intended in the country due to multiple factors, 
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including the prevailing rule-based accounting culture of the country, a lack of qualified accountants 
and insufficient training on standards, and a failure to understand and apply accrual information at the 
political level. In Vietnam, a new accounting law came into effect in 2017, which is claimed to be a 
response of the central government to the WB and the ADB for their recurring criticisms over a lack 
of transparency in financial reporting (ACCA, 2017). Central to this new law is the enforcement of 
accrual-based standards across public entities, although such accounting standards are non-existent at 
the moment (ADB, 2016). A transition towards ACC.A with accrual-based IPSASs has been ongoing 
in the central government of Malaysia since 2014. It could be argued that Malaysia might be in a 
better position in terms of adopting IPSASs due to its relatively well-developed accounting profession 
and accounting education inherited from the colonial eras. However, its National Audit Office has 
highlighted several cases of non-compliance of the regulations by ministries and departments. This 
questions the extent to which the accrual-based Malaysian Public Sector Accounting Standards 
(MPSASs), which correspond to IPSASs, would cater for the requirements of a local context (NADM, 
2016).  
To sum up, although the ADB (2013, p. 2) claimed in a report that ‘33 countries in Asia and the 
Pacific and nine non-regional ADB member countries have adopted or are adopting accrual-based 
IPSAS, or converging their national standards to the IPSAS-based accounting framework’, empirical 
evidence supporting this claim is weak. Limited communication flows at different levels and the 
underestimation of the complexities of IPSASs have appeared to be the key factors making the 
diffusion trajectory of IPSASs ineffective in Asia-Pacific regions. 
 
IPSASs in Latin America 
 
There is little interest in the Cash Basis IPSAS in Latin America, as most governments have moved 
away from pure cash to modified cash accounting in the last decade (IFAC, 2010). Institutional 
pressures for modernising cash accounting have been rather coercive given the substantial fiscal risks 
that countries in the region are exposed to (Manes Rossi et al., 2016). A large number of Latin 
American countries have therefore envisaged accrual IPSASs as a means of modernising their 
government accounting practice (Brusca and Martinez, 2016).  
Pessoa and Pimenta (2016) have attempted to categorise Latin American countries into four 
groups in terms of undertaking a transition toward IPSASs. The first group consists of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay – countries that have not formally initiated any steps towards IPSASs 
despite the commitment. El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama have been put into the 
second group, as these countries have developed a public sector accounting reform strategy in which 
the adoption of IPSASs has been claimed to be a final goal. In the third group, there are countries – 
including Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Honduras – which have officially 
declared the adoption of IPSASs on a gradual basis, after having revisited the existing accounting 
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regulations and policies. For instance, Ecuador has developed a timeline to complete the adoption of 
IPSASs by 2019. IPSASs have officially been adopted in countries belonging to the last group, which 
includes, for example, Brazil, Costa Rica and Peru. However, the actual implementation of IPSASs in 
these countries has been rather disappointing. The modernisation of government accounting through 
the adoption of IPSASs has turned out to be more rhetorical than real in Peru. Here, a great deal of 
work, crucial for an effective implementation of IPSASs, has been left incomplete (Brusca et al., 
2016). Errors were abounding in the reporting of assets, liabilities, depreciation, service concessions 
and pension liabilities, which have questioned the capacity of the Peruvian central government to 
adhere to the requirements of IPSASs (Ramirez, 2015). The pursuit of cash budgeting despite the 
adoption of ACC.A and IPSASs has made accrual information costly and at the same time useless in 
Brazil (ACCA, 2017). 
In conclusion, although Pessoa and Pimenta (2016) state that Latin American countries have 
embarked on IPSASs trajectories, no country in the region has fully implemented IPSASs in practice 
as intended. A key challenge these countries have experienced concerns the technicalities inherited 
into IPSASs. A range of IPSASs (e.g. IPSAS 17: Property, Plant and Equipment, IPSAS 19: 
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, or IPSAS 31: Intangible Assets) have 
proved to be far too complex in the Latin American context (ACCA, 2017). Similar to other regions, 
insufficient engagement of the professional accounting institutions, the prevalence of pro-innovation 
biases, an absence of the boundary-spanning process and limited communication flows (Jackson and 
Lapsley, 2004) have all deviated the diffusion trajectory of IPSASs in Latin American countries.  
 
IPSASs in Developed Countries 
 
The description of IPSASs in developed countries concentrates on OECD countries (with 
accompanying details in Table 1 in the Appendix), due to the OECD’s long-standing and persistent 
devotion to accounting reforms in its membership countries – encompassing geographically widely 
dispersed countries. One of the triggers of implementing IPSASs is a general trend in private sector 
accounting towards International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs; these are the basis on which 
IPSASs are developed), at least in some European countries. Together with the IFAC, the OECD 
recently conducted a survey amongst its then 34 member countries to learn more about ACC.A 
implementations and experiences (IFAC and OECD, 2017). The major findings are presented below 
and enriched by further studies identified in the literature review (the values do sometimes not sum up 
to 100% due to rounding differences). 
Amongst the OECD countries, 73.5% prepare annual financial reports on an accrual basis, 
17.6% on a cash basis and 8.8% are transitioning toward ACC.A. 29.4% report IPSASs as the primary 
reference point for standard setting. Still, amongst all OECD countries, only Switzerland reports that 
it has directly implemented IPSASs, and even here, the government’s cabinet can authorise deviations 
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from single IPSAS standards. 11.8% of countries consider IPSASs as a reference point going forward 
(IFAC and OECD, 2017). Within the European Union, there is a general view supporting the 
development of a separate set of European Public Sector Accounting Standards (EPSASs) rather than 
a compliance with IPSASs (Pontoppidan and Brusca, 2016); yet, IPSASs provided a starting point for 
such considerations. A professional report was commissioned that assessed the ‘accounting maturity’ 
of member states, taking IPSASs as a reference (PwC, 2014). 
When it comes to reform benefits being achieved, eight ‘no-reformers’ have been excluded 
(listed as N/A in Table 1). 11.8% of the countries (South Korea, New Zealand and Spain) claim the 
ACC.A reform benefits have been fully achieved, 61.8% state they have partially been achieved, 
while 26.5% have not reported any specific benefits being achieved (typically because their reform 
endeavour has not come to an end or because they only recently completed the reform). Improved 
transparency, accountability and public awareness of public finances are the most commonly heralded 
benefits. Yet, a large proportion of the countries also report they are struggling with usefulness, i.e. 
making ACC.A information sufficiently relevant (and understandable) for users. Finally, the 
responses of countries vary a great deal when assessing the types and degrees of challenges they 
encountered during their ACC.A reform. 14.7% argue they did not encounter any major challenges 
(Austria, Canada, Japan and South Korea), while other countries list a range of major challenging 
issues, such as long implementation periods of up to 25 years (OECD and IFAC, 2017). 
 
IPSASs in Anglo-Saxon Countries 
 
The Anglo-Saxon countries, except Ireland (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States), represent early reformers, as they initiated ACC.A reforms during 
the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. For instance, in the United States, the Federal Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board was established in 1990 (IFAC, 2006), while the move toward ACC.A started in 
1996 (Global Government Forum, 2017). Most of the Anglo-Saxon countries have an independent 
standard-setting body (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). Only New Zealand 
refers mainly to IPSASs, while the rest adhere to the IFRSs or have no particular basis (OECD and 
IFAC, 2017). With respect to implementation strategy, ACC.A implementation emerged as part of a 
larger performance-driven reform in Australia and New Zealand, seeking also to strengthen the fiscal 
position and financial management system. In Ireland, there had been a degree of ACC.A ‘rhetoric’, 
which largely disappeared in 2002 (Hyndman and Connolly, 2011). Nowadays, the consideration of a 
larger accrual reform appears to have been driven by developments at EU level (particularly the 
EPSASs project), as well as recommendations from the IMF (OECD and IFAC, 2017).  
Canada emphasised competence building and a stepwise reform approach, which resulted in a 
‘smooth reform implementation’ (OECD and IFAC, 2017, p. 50). New Zealand benefitted from 
having experienced and qualified staff members and ‘leveraging systems and practices from the 
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private sector’ (e.g. professional accountants and corporate IT systems)’ (ibid., p. 94). Having IPSASs 
as a reference also simplified the process. In the United Kingdom, pilots and dry runs were used to 
reduce the reform risks, while disseminating best practice became important, alongside stakeholder 
commitment (ibid.). Here, the driver behind ACC.A adoption was the desire to ‘modernise, enhance 
accountability and improve decision-making’ (ibid., 2017, pp. 122–123). Australia worked with 
consultants during the implementation phase, for example, while conducting staff training.  
Countries have experienced somewhat similar implementation challenges. These include 
developing and implementing new IT systems and establishing the OBS (e.g. Australia and the United 
Kingdom). Australia underscores the challenge of coordinating and monitoring the reform and 
providing guidance. Similarly, the United Kingdom stresses the capacity building and training issues. 
There is a stated need to improve the experienced usefulness of ACC.A information (e.g. the United 
Kingdom and Canada). In Canada, this is believed to relate to the modified cash-based appropriations. 
ACC.A information quality is a concern and could be related to limited perceived ACC.A usefulness. 
For example, in the United States, where the Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits the 
financial statements, ‘[s]everal long-standing material weaknesses and other scope limitations have 
prevented GAO from being able to express any opinion on the federal government’s consolidated 
financial statements’ (ibid., 2017, p. 126). Finally, research on New Zealand has found a shift of 
power from the legislative to the executive with the introduction of ACC.A reforms (here, Newberry 
and Pallot [2005, p. 263] ask if such initiatives represent ‘a wolf in sheep’s clothing’) and the 
advancing of an ‘agenda which is consistent with neo-liberal principles’ (Ellwood and Newberry, 
2011, p. 549). 
 
IPSASs in Nordic Countries 
 
The Nordic countries represent a ‘second reform wave’ of ACC.A adopters, following the Anglo-
Saxon countries, particularly Sweden, Finland and Iceland, in the 1990s, as well as Denmark in 2003. 
Although Norway is an exception (maintaining cash accounting as the main model), an ACC.A pilot 
project was initiated in 2004. When designing an ACC.A implementation strategy, a stepwise 
approach (Bietenhader and Bergmann, 2010) was preferred (e.g. in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 
and implicitly also in Iceland, given the country’s gradual and long-lasting implementation period). 
The stepwise approach refers to the choice of starting with some organisations and then continuing 
with more at the same or other levels of the central government. Furthermore, such a strategy means 
different topics and areas were considered or developed gradually (OECD and IFAC, 2017). 
Norway’s approach to central government accounting stands out from the rest of the Nordic countries. 
Norway experimented with ACC.A in a pilot project from 2004 to 2009, while deciding to assess the 
accrual experience on a cost-benefit approach. The project ended without mandatory changes, except 
the compulsory implementation of a new chart of accounts. The ACC.A-based standards that have 
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been developed by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are predominantly based on private sector 
accounting, with IPSASs standards serving as a supplementary framework in a few areas (including 
the numbering of the standards). After having been tested in pilot organisations they became 
voluntary standards. Higher educational institutions nevertheless have to report to their ministry on 
the basis of these standards. 
As for drivers of adoption, Sweden embarked on a result-based management reform path for its 
central government agencies, which spurred full cost accounting information. They also wanted to 
make it easier to recruit professional accountants at the central government level (OECD and IFAC, 
2017). As such, Sweden appears to have had a practical take on approaching ACC.A. Norway was 
more a mixed case, where the choice to experiment with ACC.A was driven by different internal and 
external forces, including the developments in other Scandinavian countries, alongside other OECD 
countries, modifications of the macro-economic steering and politicians desiring a more long-term 
financial perspective (Gårseth-Nesbakk, 2007). Finland considered the historical cost-oriented 
revenue/expense model – which was already established when IPSASs started to emerge – to be a 
better fit for the public sector than a fair value-oriented balance sheet preoccupation. Moreover, it did 
not face any strong institutional pressure to change toward IPSASs (Oulasvirta, 2014). 
Regarding implementation challenges, Iceland, Finland (OECD and IFAC, 2017) and Norway 
(Gårseth-Nesbakk and Mellemvik, 2011) struggled with compiling an OBS. Finland also found it hard 
to get the financial statements prepared within the legal timeframe. Iceland struggled with 
consolidation and developing IT systems, guidance, manuals and training. Sweden’s long 
implementation period supposedly makes it difficult to identify specific reform challenges. Decision 
usefulness and user interest are reportedly common struggles in the Nordic countries. Finland remains 
to fully achieve the benefits regarding public awareness, efficiency gains and asset management. In 
Denmark, analysing and linking full cost information to performance remains an issue and therefore 
also accountability (OECD and IFAC, 2017). In Norway (MoF Norway, 2016) and Sweden, the 
usefulness of the ACC.A information is questionable with regard to decision-making, not only 
amongst politicians, but also for other users (OECD and IFAC, 2017). 
Unintended consequences of implementation include matters of complexity. In Norway, 
deviations from the voluntary ACC.A solutions were made to allow for other public sector-specific 
traits, whereby the accounting solutions were comparable with other jurisdictions in some accounting 
areas, but not in others. This dualism reflects autopoiesis-based ACC.A representations (Gårseth-
Nesbakk, 2011), resulting in standards becoming more complex, and where users were not involved 
in the construction of the accounting standards (Gårseth-Nesbakk and Mellemvik, 2011). 
 
IPSASs in Non-Nordic European Countries 
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ACC.A and IPSASs reform experiences in non-Nordic European countries are mixed. Some countries 
embarked early on their ACC.A reforms (e.g. Switzerland, Poland and Spain, and to some extent, also 
Estonia and France). Others began in the late 2000s or thereafter – constituting a ‘third reform wave’ 
together with the other OECD countries (e.g. Austria). Still, some countries have hesitated (Greece, 
Luxemburg and Slovenia), while others have decided against ACC.A reforms on the central 
government level (Germany and the Netherlands). 
Switzerland is probably the most dedicated IPSASs adopter in the world (required by law to 
prepare its financial statements and notes in accordance with IPSAS requirements; see also Bergmann 
2012). It is followed by Austria, which fully applies 20 and partially five out of 32 IPSASs that were 
available when the reform decision was made. Furthermore, in Estonia, the legislation requires 
national accounting standards to be based on IPSASs. Pontoppidan and Brusca (2016) state that along 
with Estonia, seven more countries – Austria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Portugal and Spain 
– have incorporated IPSASs in their national regulations (see Jorge et al. [2019] on the trajectories of 
the latter two countries). Some countries (e.g. the Czech Republic) emphasise the need for standards 
to deviate from IPSASs, to allow for taking further public sector specificities into consideration 
(OECD and IFAC, 2017). Germany is claimed to be the most reluctant country in terms of 
appreciating IPSASs and their implementation (Pontoppidan and Brusca, 2016). In a recent report on 
the EPSASs project, the German Supreme Audit Institution took ‘the view that the mandatory 
introduction of EPSAS[s] intended by the Commission is not an appropriate means to achieve the 
improvements sought’ (German SAI, 2017, p. 22). 
Implementation strategies reflected different reform approaches, legal traditions, and 
communicative and quality issues. Some countries have explicitly applied a cost-benefit approach 
when considering their approach toward ACC.A, either ex ante (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands, 
both of whom decided against ACC.A and IPSASs) or when considering the extent to which 
particular standards should be implemented (e.g. Austria and Poland). Countries deciding against 
ACC.A may still apply it in some of their central government entities (e.g. agencies in the 
Netherlands, or state-owned enterprises in Germany). Key reasons stated against ACC.A are the need 
to maintain control over public finances and maintain cash as the most relevant input to the budgetary 
process. In general, countries have found it useful to approach ACC.A in a stepwise manner (e.g. 
Belgium and Spain incorporated double-entry bookkeeping first, then modified and later full ACC.A 
principles). ACC.A implementation strategies are also influenced by the legal traditions in countries 
where accounting standards have to be enacted in legislation (examples include Poland, Portugal and 
Switzerland). Furthermore, in Slovenia the MoF is preparing a revision to the accounting law, which 
will demand reporting on both a cash basis and an ACC.A basis. The ACC.A adoption should be 
completed by 2022. Here, ‘[t]he authorities do not anticipate major challenges’ (OECD and IFAC, 
2017, p. 108). When forming an ACC.A implementation strategy, other countries focused particularly 
on communication with the public (e.g. Portugal); (planned) reliance on international frameworks for 
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government statistics (e.g. Greece), such as the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual or the 
European Union’s European System of National and Regional Accounts (OECD and IFAC, 2017); or 
settling for making ACC.A information complementary to cash-based reports (e.g. Italy). During 
operational, i.e. more progressed, phases, countries like France and Hungary have stressed the need to 
improve the quality of financial data and related matters, such as guidance, intern control and audit 
functions (ibid.). 
Driving forces of ACC.A (non-)implementation include the views of stakeholders. A lack of 
political support may hamper reform efforts (e.g. in Germany), while the opposite was reportedly the 
case in Poland. Moreover, in the Slovak Republic, international standards have been pursued due to 
the needs of stakeholders, including the national parliament, foreign investors, the IMF, etc. Similarly, 
in Belgium, external consultants helped out, e.g. with the IT system, while in the Slovak Republic, the 
WB provided technical assistance during the implementation phase (OECD and IFAC, 2017). 
Changes in economic systems (Poland) or related reform areas (e.g. budgeting in Austria and the 
Slovak Republic) also served as implementation drivers. 
As for implementation challenges, developing and implementing IT systems have been difficult 
(e.g. in the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland). Informational 
usefulness and public awareness are regarded as struggles in Austria, Belgium, Poland and 
Switzerland. Competence (locating or training) is a commonly stated inadequacy (Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, France, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Switzerland), and for some, developing 
accounting manuals (France and Spain). While establishing the OBS (in particular, valuation of assets 
and liabilities) is demanding (Belgium, France, Poland and Spain), also, subsequent accounting data 
quality relating to harmonisation (Belgium) and consolidation issues (the Czech Republic) has been 
found to be an issue. Amending rules and regulations has been challenging in some countries 
(Hungary, Italy, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Spain), while others struggled with managing the 
reforms (the Czech Republic, Poland and Switzerland). Stakeholder coverage is reported as an issue 
by Belgium and Switzerland. Finally, countries continue to strive for establishing sufficient 
transparency and accountability (e.g. the Czech Republic and Poland [OECD and IFAC, 2017]). 
 
IPSASs in Other OECD Countries 
 
The residual OECD countries started their ACC.A reforms in the mid or late 2000s during the ‘third 
ACC.A reform wave’ (Israel, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey), except Chile (2011) and Japan 
(2000). In Chile, a staged implementation approach was followed (2011: ACC.A, 2016: IPSASs for 
central government, and IPSASs for municipalities at a later stage). Local standards allowed for 
deviations from IPSASs, due to complexity, resource intensity or national specificities. Israel, Turkey 
and South Korea also followed a stepwise approach. Israel found this gradual approach expedient 
since it was used to a pure cash accounting system, while South Korea benefitted from introducing a 
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new IT system prior to the ACC.A reform (OECD and IFAC, 2017). External assistance (handling the 
development of manuals and training of officials) was a driving force in Chile when incorporating 
IPSASs into its national accounting framework (ibid.). 
As for implementation challenges, ACC.A can be more complex and demanding to implement 
than foreseen. For example, Mexico endeavoured to implement ACC.A in only one and a half years, 
but it took seven years to publish the first consolidated financial statements. Mexico struggled overall 
with coordinating the federal, state and local levels, while preparing the reform. Finding and training 
competent staff and defining their roles and responsibilities also proved difficult. Moreover, the IT 
system took more time to develop than expected. Furthermore, ACC.A information is not applied 
much in direct decision-making, management or analysis (OECD and IFAC, 2017). Similarly, in 
Japan, interest in ACC.A information remains low (ibid.). Israel struggled when having to introduce a 
centralised IT system, training and mentoring programmes. Work continues regarding coverage and 
quality of the financial statements (ibid.). Evidence for Turkey on IPSASs adoption suggests that 
harmonisation on a formal level (‘decision’) is substantially more advanced than on the material level 
(‘actual implementation’ [Ada/Christiaens, 2018]). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This research was embarked on with the question: What is the current status of the adoption and 
implementation of the IPSASs at central government level in developing and developed countries? 
The starting point of this study was that IPSASs supposedly supplement the effective use of ACC.A 
and reinforce intended benefits for improved public sector governance and accountability (Ball and 
Pflugrath, 2012). After a re-analysis of literature from the realms of academia, professional bodies 
and international organisations, it was found that, first, while there have been three main ACC.A 
reform waves amongst OECD countries (first, Anglo-Saxon countries; second, Nordic countries; 
third, a portion of non-Nordic European countries – see Tables 2 and 3), the situation is less clear for 
developing countries (Table 1). Here, while some countries embarked on IPSASs trajectories by 
starting with implementing the Cash Basis IPSAS (e.g. in Asia and in Africa), the general reform 
trend in Latin America was changing systems initially from cash to accruals and now to accrual-based 
IPSASs. 
Hepworth stated that for developing countries ‘the implementation of the accrual-based IPSASs 
[…] is not an appropriate reform unless preceded or accompanied by other, essentially managerial, 
reforms’ (2017, p. 141). Indeed, the IPSASs, with their emphasis on enhancing transparency and 
accountability, might run counter the objectives of those powerful groups that control violence (e.g. 
warlords). Recent development theory (the ‘Access Order theory of development’ formulated by New 
Institutional Economists [North et al. 2013]) argues that violence in developing countries is controlled 
by limiting public access to political and economic organizations (‘Limited Access Order’). 
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Redistributing rents (e.g. from state monopolies) to those groups in power provides an incentive for 
their peaceful cooperation within the existing order (Bunse and Fritz 2012). Introducing the IPSASs 
might be at odds with such an equilibrium, as rent-skimming behaviour could be easier revealed with 
a more of transparency; with this, implementation incentives are low. Given this situation, it is argued 
that development policy should centre on how the state can strengthen its control over violence and, 
subsequently, on how to create a (legal) framework for that eventually leads to an ‘Open Access 
Order’ (ibid.). Therefore, the institutional context in developing countries might be largely unsuitable 
for introducing IPSASs. IPSASs (pushed by international donors) might be hitting the targets of 
donors, but remain superficial, or might even be detrimental to development. A decoupling between 
reform ‘talk’ and ‘walk’ would be the consequence. For example, Lassou concluded in a recent study 
that formal government accrual accounting reforms, including the implementation of IPSASs, have 
been used in Benin and Ghana as a façade to hide ‘patronage and clientelism abound within an 
informal setting, which make adopted accounting rules and procedures redundant; hence the observed 
limited role of accounting in improved accountability, governance, and ultimately development (e.g. 
poverty reduction)’ (2017, p. 502).  
The majority of the developed countries that have implemented IPSASs belong to the third 
reform wave (middle 2000s and onwards), compared with only one (Ireland) of six Anglo-Saxon 
countries (first wave) and none of the five Nordic countries (second wave). This reluctance of early 
reformers (first and second wave) to discard institutionalised ACC.A solutions can be interpreted as 
them already having grown accustomed to ACC.A and their established solutions when the IPSASs 
emerged. A commonly observed pattern was that phased reform approaches were followed 
(Bietenhader and Bergmann, 2010) – maybe with the exception of Austria that moved from a cash-
based accounting system directly to accrual-based IPSASs. Yet, countries have very different 
implementation strategies for their ACC.A and IPSASs reforms in terms of speed, which suggests 
they plan differently and vary (considerably) regarding their level of optimism as they embark on the 
reform(s). There is a great variation in countries’ transition periods to ACC.A, varying from one and a 
half to 25 years. Slovenia, for example, appears to be very optimistic, as it has planned to implement 
ACC.A during a short-term period, while not expecting any large challenges along the way. This 
could be explained with the circumstance that Slovenia is a relatively small country, and has a 
relatively small public sector.   
The applied analytical framework that combined neo-institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) with diffusion theory (Rogers, 2003) – and in particular its focus 
on differentiating between the ‘decision’ and the ‘implementation’ stages – helped us to identify and 
understand issues with (actual) implementation and unintended consequences of reforms. There are 
three aspects to this.   
First, in a number of countries – both developing and developed – a decoupling between ‘walk’ 
and ‘talk’ can be observed (e.g. Tanzania: Goddard et al., 2016; Ireland: Connolly and Hyndman, 
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2011). This can be interpreted in that for parts of developing countries, IPSASs adoption seems to be 
rather an exercise of seeking legitimacy from donor organisations (Andrews, 2010; Adhikari and 
Gårseth-Nesbakk, 2016).  
Second, diffusion theory directs attention towards taking a closer look at ‘formal’ and ‘actual’ 
implementation of IPSASs. While some previous studies treat IPSASs adoption as a dichotomous 
variable (adopters vs. non-adopters; Sellami and Gafsi, 2019), this paper showed that countries can 
also make some adaptations to the IPSASs during the process of adoption (see, for example, the 
research of Ada and Christiaens [2019] on ‘formal’ decision vs. ‘material’ implementation, or on 
Baskerville and Grossi’s [2019] study on the ‘glocalisation’ of IPSASs). Using such an approach 
helped to better understand these issues. In most of developing countries, ACC.A and IPSASs reforms 
appeared to be bundled, and their implementation has remained more a rhetoric due to a number of 
factors, including, amongst others, a failure of the accounting profession to act as boundary spanners, 
limited inter-organisational communication flows and networks, and pro-innovation biases (see, for 
example, Jackson and Lapsley, 2003; Ezzamel et al., 2014). 
Third, taking a closer look at implementation revealed quality issues of data in some developed 
countries, and, connected to this, usefulness of information. For instance, that there was a particular 
need to improve the quality, timeliness and completeness of the accounting data has been attested for 
Hungary and France (OECD and IFAC, 2017). Several ACC.A reforming countries struggle with 
attracting sufficient stakeholder interest and ensuring information usefulness. Moreover, the hesitation 
amongst politicians to give up their budgetary control and their attempt at maintaining dominance in 
public sector decision-making has in many developed countries resulted in extending uncertainty in 
the diffusion trajectory of ACC.A at the implementation phase. Addressing power issues and 
resource-control problems might therefore explain part of the struggle with attracting a greater user 
interest in ACC.A information, particularly in developed countries.  
Summing up, there are remarkable differences regarding whether countries acknowledge 
having experienced large implementation challenges and the extent to which the reform benefits have 
been achieved. These differences have an institutional theoretical underpinning: either it is very 
important for some countries to appear as ‘successful’ and ‘robust’ with regard to their ACC.A and 
IPSASs implementation, or it is institutionally important to do it, so they are overly optimistic about 
the transition period. Hence, being able to claim they are doing it is arguably more important than 
doing it well. This leads to questions about the measures to be taken to address and overcome these 
challenges. A learning point for practitioners in individual countries and standard setters is that it 
normally takes a lot of time to persuade critics of the merits of a new accounting model or a set of 
accounting standards and to subsequently ensure the accounting standards and solutions are actually 
being implemented. Countries that have experienced better results from introducing ACC.A seem to 
have done it as part of a larger reform package or on the basis of an internally experienced need for 
change. Countries with the greatest difficulties and worst results appear to be those that have been 
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subject to coercive (external) pressures, most commonly, the developing countries (Hopper et al., 
2017). The developing countries actually exhibit diametrical effects, where theorised benefits are 
missing and replaced by unintended consequences such as increased corruption. A combined 
application of neo-institutional theory and diffusion theory has in this way enabled an outlining of 
many of the issues relating to ACC.A and IPSASs implementation across countries, which have 
remained marginalised in extant public sector accounting work. 
As with any research, this study has a number of limitations that, at the same time, provide 
avenues for future investigation. First, the analysis centred on a synthesis of extant literature on the 
central government level, but regional and local governments, as well as social funds, also underwent 
ACC.A reforms and implemented IPSASs. Further studies could look at those tiers of government and 
focus in depth on contrasting reform ‘talk’ with the actual implementation and reform outcomes 
(‘walk’) – acknowledging that this is not a straightforward task, especially in the public sector 
(Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). Here, it is proposed as a research strategy to first identify the most 
common and pressing implementation problems that countries are facing through interviews, and then 
to follow up with a survey that goes beyond treating IPSAS implementation as a binary variable (e.g. 
Sellami and Gafsi, 2019). Based on the obtained data, countries could be grouped into clusters, or 
aspects of IPSASs implementation could be explained by countries’ economic, administrative and 
legal factors.1 Second, this research focused on the diffusion of IPSASs and not on the 
implementation of the conceptual framework (CF) that was issued in 2013 by the IPSASB. Here, the 
scarce recent research on this topic has found that ‘many structural differences still occur within and 
among countries, showing that much work is still necessary to obtain harmonisation as implied in the 
IPSASB’s CF’ (Manes Rossi et al., 2014, p. 456). We would encourage research on the CF, especially 
as some contradictions with private sector accounting frameworks have been identified (Bisogno et 
al., forthc.). Lastly, the application of cost-benefit calculations is common amongst a number of the 
countries that have either been more reluctant to move toward ACC.A (e.g. German SAI, 2017), or 
that have taken several deviations in their IPSASs standards and practices. It is therefore for further 
research to analyse more thoroughly the cost-benefit approaches that are being used for justifying the 
(non)implementation of IPSASs or other public sector accounting reforms – and in particular the 
assumptions that are being made regarding costs and benefits that have been underestimated and 
overestimated. 
                                                          
1
 We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 1: Implementation of IPSASs in Developing Countries 
 
 Examples – 
Countries of 
Investigation 
Implementation 
Strategy 
Drivers on 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Challenges 
Unintended 
Consequences of 
Implementation 
South 
Asia 
Sri Lanka; 
Bangladesh; 
India 
Often, Cash Basis 
IPSAS are adopted 
International 
pressures 
(donors) 
Technical 
ambiguities; lack of 
training and 
education; valuation 
IPSASs 
implementation at 
times rather a 
legitimacy 
seeking exercise 
Africa South 
Africa; 
Uganda; 
Zimbabwe; 
Ghana; 
Benin 
More than 30 
governments have 
adopted Cash Basis 
IPSAS 
Donor 
prescriptions 
within good 
governance 
principles 
Challenges to fulfill 
key reporting 
requirements of the 
Cash Basis IPSAS: 
consolidated 
statements; disclosing 
support received in 
kind from donors; 
long transition 
periods; shortage of 
skilled staff 
Rise of 
corruption, 
patronage politics 
and neo-
patrimonialism; 
fabrication of 
standards 
Asia 
Pacific 
Indonesia; 
Thailand; 
Vietnam; 
Malaysia 
33 countries have 
implemented accrual-
based IPSASs; 
Thai/Malay Public 
Sector Accounting 
Standards (T/MPSASs) 
based on IPSASs 
WB; ADB Lacking will and skill 
of politicians and 
other stakeholders 
regarding applying 
accrual information in 
decision-making; lack 
of qualified 
accountants; 
insufficient trainings 
In Indonesia: 
dysfunctional 
impact of 
contractors to 
implement 
reforms; 
decentralization 
has led to 
increased local 
corruption and 
paralyzed the 
independency of 
internal auditors 
Latin 
America 
Honduras; 
El Salvador; 
Guatemala, 
Nicaragua; 
Panama; 
Colombia; 
Dominican 
Republic; 
Ecuador; 
Peru; Brazil 
Little interest on the 
Cash Basis IPSAS, as 
modified cash 
accounting has been 
frequently 
implemented; some 
countries are still in the 
process of gradual 
implementation, others 
have finished 
implementation 
Rather coercive 
institutional 
modernization 
pressures given 
the fiscal risks 
that countries in 
the region were 
exposed to 
Concerns with the 
technicalities 
inherited to IPSASs; 
complexity of certain 
standards; errors in 
reporting; merely 
formal adoption in 
some countries 
Still too early to 
assess the 
implications of 
IPSASs 
implementation 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors, based on review of the literature 
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Table 2: Implementation of IPSASs in Developed Countries 
 
 Examples – 
Countries of 
Investigation 
Implementation 
Strategy 
Drivers on 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Challenges 
Unintended 
Consequences of 
Implementation 
Anglo-
Saxon 
Australia; 
Canada; 
Ireland; New 
Zealand; 
United 
Kingdom; 
United States 
Early reformers, 
larger reform 
package, often private 
sector oriented 
ACC.A 
Internal forces 
mostly (except 
Ireland) 
Information 
technology (IT) 
systems, OBS, 
ACC.A information 
usefulness 
ACC.A 
information 
quality issues, 
audit opinions 
lacking or in 
jeopardy (United 
States especially) 
Nordic Denmark; 
Finland; 
Iceland; 
Norway; 
Sweden 
Nordic countries 
followed Anglo-
Saxon countries in 
implementing 
ACC.A. A stepwise 
approach was 
common 
Limited 
(external) 
institutional 
pressure. 
Internal sources 
and practices 
more important 
OBS, decision 
usefulness and user 
interest 
Complex 
solutions due to 
special accounting 
techniques (e.g. 
Norway) 
Non-
Nordic 
European  
Austria; 
Belgium; 
Czech 
Republic; 
Estonia; 
France; 
Germany; 
Greece; 
Hungary; 
Italy; 
Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; 
Poland; 
Portugal; 
Slovak 
Republic; 
Slovenia; 
Spain; 
Switzerland 
Cost-benefit 
approach, stepwise 
manner, 
implementation 
aligned with legal 
traditions, continued 
quality enhancing 
measures 
Different 
stakeholders’ 
views – 
encompassing 
politicians, 
international 
standard setters 
and 
transnational 
institutions, 
such as IMF, 
consultants; 
combined traces 
of isomorphic 
pressures 
IT systems, 
Informational 
usefulness and public 
awareness, 
competence, OBS, 
data quality, 
amending rules and 
regulation, managing 
the reform and 
stakeholder coverage 
Argued economic 
consequences 
concerning debt 
levels (e.g. 
Greece) 
Other 
OECD 
Chile; 
Mexico; 
Israel; Japan; 
(South) 
Korea; Turkey 
Cost-benefit approach 
(e.g. Chile), stepwise 
approach 
External 
assistance with 
the practical 
implementation 
(e.g. Chile) 
Complexity, training 
and competence, IT 
systems, 
informational 
usefulness and public 
awareness 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors, based on review of the literature 
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Table 3: Overview of Accrual Accounting Reforms in OECD Countries 
 
Country Accounting 
basis 
Primary 
standard 
setting 
reference 
Accrual 
reform 
status 
Transition period 
to accrual 
accounting 
Benefits achieved 
(improved …) 
Australia Accruals IFRSs Completed Progressed 
through the 1990s 
(10 years) 
Transparency, 
accountability, 
usefulness of data for 
fiscal analysis, asset 
management 
Austria Accruals IPSASs Completed 2009-2014 (5 
years) 
Budgetary process 
applied (forecasting and 
evaluations) 
Belgium Accruals Eurostat’s 
European 
System of 
Accounts  
Ongoing 2009-2020? (11 
years) 
Financial information, 
standardization, 
consistency and 
integration; 
Canada Accruals Not defined Completed Mid 1990s-2003 
(8 years) 
Transparency, 
accountability, public 
awareness, financial 
business processes 
Chile Accruals IPSASs Ongoing 2011-?  Not assessed 
Czech 
Republic 
Accruals IPSASs Ongoing 2007-2016? (9 
years) 
Fiscal statistics  
Denmark Accruals Private 
sector 
(IPSAS 
recently) 
Completed 2003-2008 (5 
years); 
improvements 
ongoing 
Full costs of operation 
information 
Estonia Accruals IPSASs Completed 2003-2005 (2 
years) 
Not stated 
Finland Accruals Private 
sector 
Completed During 1990s (8-
10 years?) 
Transparency, 
accountability 
France Accruals Not defined Completed 2001/2002-2006 
(4 years)  
Transparency, 
accountability, public 
awareness, asset and 
liabilities management, 
information to 
stakeholders 
Germany Cash Not defined No plans 
(not an 
option) 
N/A N/A 
Greece Cash 
transitioning 
to accruals 
Not defined Planned 2016?-?  N/A 
Hungary Accruals Not defined Completed 2013-2015 (1.5 
year)  
Not yet 
Iceland Accruals Private 
sector 
(IPSAS 
recently) 
Ongoing 1998-? Not assessed (beyond 
improved forecasts and 
ratio analysis) 
Ireland Cash Not defined Being 
considered 
N/A N/A 
Israel Accruals IPSASs Completed Mid 2000s-
2013/2014 (10 
years)  
Public awareness, user 
orientation/relevance, 
transparency, reliability, 
comprehensive 
information 
Italy Cash Not defined Ongoing 2009-? Not assessed 
Japan Accruals Private 
sector 
Completed 2000-2005 (5 
years)  
Evaluation of the full 
cost of public policies 
(South) Korea Accruals IPSASs Completed 2009-2011 (2 
years)  
Better information and 
understanding of public 
  28 
finances, performance 
based fiscal 
management, full costs 
per project, transparency 
and financial 
management 
Luxemburg Cash Hitherto no 
clear 
reference, 
planning 
EPSASs 
orientation 
Planned N/A N/A 
Mexico Accruals Not defined Completed 2008-2015 (7 
years)  
Transparency, 
accountability, public 
awareness 
Netherlands Cash Not defined No plans 
(not an 
option) 
N/A N/A 
New Zealand Accruals IPSASs Completed 1988-1994 (6 
years)  
Transparency and 
performance based 
accountability evaluation 
Norway Cash Main 
accounts: 
Not defined 
Accruals in 
some 
agencies: 
private 
sector 
No plans 
(not an 
option) 
N/A N/A 
Poland Accruals Not defined Completed 1990s Not yet achieved 
Portugal Cash trans. 
to accruals 
Transition-
ing toward 
IPSASs 
Ongoing 2015/2016-? N/A 
Slovak 
Republic 
Accruals IPSASs Completed 1998-2006 (8 
years)  
Not stated 
Slovenia Cash 
(transition 
to accruals) 
IMF’s 
Government 
Finance 
Statistics 
Manual, 
(partially 
IFRSs) 
Planned 
(adopted by 
2022?) 
N/A N/A 
Spain Accruals IPSASs Completed 1980s-2010 (25 
years)  
Financial information, 
standardization of 
business processes, 
accountability and 
transparency, (ratio) 
analysis 
Sweden Accruals Not defined Completed 1990s-2010? (15 
years) 
Not yet (properly) 
achieved 
Switzerland Accruals IPSASs Completed 2000s-? (the end 
not specified) 
Transparency and 
accountability 
Turkey Accruals IPSASs 
(vaguely) 
Ongoing 2005-? Transparency and 
accountability 
United 
Kingdom 
Accruals IFRSs Completed 1993-2002 (10 
years)  
Making additional 
financial information 
available, close 
alignment of estimates, 
budgets and accounts 
United States 
of America 
Accruals Not defined Not stated 1996-? (an end is 
not specified) 
Not stated 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors, based on review of the literature (foremost OECD and IFAC 2017) 
 
